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Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case; Again Mr. Jensen includes an error ridden summary of the 
events leading to this appeal. I did not bring the garnishment action and Mr. Jensen 
has failed to prove breach of contract to two courts. 
Summary of Argument 
It is difficult to reply to a 47 page shotgun blast of errors briefly. I will just offer a reply 
of what is probably already obvious to this Court, trusting the rest to its discernment. I 
believe ISSUE No. 1 is shown defective by "Utah Standards of Appellate Review" 
(I.A.2. (summary)), that Mr. Jensen fails to correctly marshal the evidence, much less 
prove clear error. ISSUE No. 2 is concerned with the form of findings and billable time. 
A review of the trial court's 7 page judgment in the light of all of Salmon v Davis County, 
Cabrera v Cottrell, Beckstrom v Beckstrom, Dixie State Bank v Bracken, and Valcarce v 
Fitzgerald shows that the trial court has substantially used its discretion according to the 
law. 
Two focal points of Mr. Jensen's appeal are Salmon v Davis County and Mr. Orton's 
affidavit. Mr. Jensen's applications of Salmon are defective and just plain wrong. This 
guts the usefulness of Mr. Orton's affidavit. Because the court that made the award 
was not the court that tried the case, and the Supreme Court upheld the substantial 




Response to Issue No. 1: 
I. Repeatedly Mr. Jensen claims that the trial court approved his rate (p. 11 "Brief of 
Appellants", hereinafter "BofA"). All the court approved was the amount submitted. The 
judge made this clear in open court. The trial court has some 900 cases, so brevity is 
necessary, not every detail of a ruling can be specified. 
It took 20 visits or phone calls for me to get two affidavits that met the trial courts 
request. My requests, which included large firms, were generally met with indifference 
to condescension. I had no aquaintance with either of the attorneys that submitted 
affidavits, and they did not know each other. Their rates were not substantially less 
than those of Mark Bell and Ronald Dunn, attorneys I have retained in the Salt Lake 
area, but having more experience. Mr. Jensen has an obvious advantage over me in 
obtaining affidavits and determining what the rates are likely to be. Surely Mr. Jensen 
knows a solo practitioner, so why did all 3 of his affidavits come from large firms? 
The affiants submitted by Mr. Jensen do not specify their own rates, (except Mr. 
Orton, which doesn't apply) but offer opinions on the rates of unspecified others, (R. 
800-803) and those rates vary considerably. Thus the affidavits that I submitted are 
more appropriate to the trial court's request and findings process. 
I.A. Mr. Jensen contends that the trial court erred when taking into consideration the 
size of the firm (p. 14 "BofA"), but size has a bearing on types and costs of services. 
One may fly Delta, first class, or Southwest, coach, for a great deal less. It is a rnatter of 
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discretion or choice and many do not feel compelled to pay more. On a resume', would 
a prospective employer consider time with a large firm part of your 'experience' or part 
your 'situation'? Part of that experience is supervision and consultation with senior 
members, which is not available to solo practices. One would question whether Mr. 
Jensen could provide all the services a large firm offered if one required them. Also, a 
large firm would not tolerate a member taking an assignment of interest in a case, as 
Mr. Jensen has in this case. 
I.B. Mr. Hartill's affidavit speaks for itself (R.822); in context the meaning of 
"courtroom work" is evident. Mr. Jensen repeatedly offers his conjecture as fact (p.17 
"BofA"). No authoritative evidence is offered; if it were, Mr. Jensen would have no 
argument because $125/hr is what Mr. Hartill charges unless he is in a courtroom. 
I.C. Mr. Jensen contends (p. 18 "BofA") the trial court erred because it did not allow 
for a raise in his rates over the period. The affidavits stated rates as of April, 2005. Mr. 
Hartill states that he has not raised his rates in the 5 years since 2000. (Quoted and 
emphasized by Mr. Jensen at p.13, "Brief of Appellants") If not for that statement, by 
Mr. Jensen' logic, the trial court would have reason to reduce his rates further for work 
in the beginning years. 
Mr. Jensen's own reasoning at p. 20, par. 2, "BofA" poisons his arguments about 
reasonable rates. His questions logically show that the minimum end of the range of fee 
rates is just as valid as the upper end. What error is there if the court should choose a 
minimalist approach? By his own observations at p.47, "BofA", \he trial court is middling. 
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Response to Issue No. 7-
As to attorney fees, in Valcarce v Fitzgerald, filed June 26,1998, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated after listing the four factors from Dixie State Bank v Bracken, "Despite this 
listing of issues, in Dixie State Bank we took care to note that what an attorney bills or 
the number of hours spent pn a case is not determinative." (emphasis mine) 
11. A. As to findings of fact, Cabrera v Cottrell, (694 P.2d 625) says, 
"In the instant case, the trial court did not enter separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, at least 
denominated as such. However, the order and judgment did contain findings of fact and legal 
conclusions, including the finding that the award was reasonable. As a matter of form, it would have 
been preferable for the trial court to have entered separate findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
addition to the order and judgment for attorneys fees, but the order and judgment are not defective 
because they are combined with findings and conclusions." 
This is what Judge Dever has done. 
As to arguments Mr. Jensen makes, based on Salmon v. Davis County at pp. 21, 25, 
27, and 37 of his Brief, he repeatedly quotes minority opinions or makes application out 
of context. The actual background of Salmon v.Davis County, is "different from most 
attorney fee cases in that the circuit court judge who heard Salmon's two misde-
meanor trials did not make the fee award decision." (916 P.2d 893) Moreover, after 
grousing at the minimal findings, (as noted and emphasized in "Brief of Appellants", p. 
25), Justice Zimmerman 
"conclude(s) that the trial court's findings are minimally sufficient to withstand a remand. The trial court 
made clear that it considered the evidence in light of some the factors outlined in Cottonwood Mall, 830 
P.2d at 269, even i the court tailed to make any findings relative to those factors." (694 P.2d 901) 
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In the light of the salient portions of Salmon, as well as the rest of the circumstances 
of this case, Mr. Orton's affidavit seems way out of bounds, possibly explaining why the 
trial court largely disregards it. 
Inconsistencies and Other Factors 
Starting at p.28, "BofA", Mr. Jensen contends with the trial court's findings relating to 
his time spent. If Mr. Jensen makes so many inconsistent statements of fact in hopes 
that I can not address them all, he succeeds. 
Mr Jensen repeatedly complains the trial court did not abide by Rule 34(d), Utah R. 
App. P.(p. 39, "BofA"). He omits that the trial court received my objection the same day 
he applied for a judgment. I submitted my objection 8 court days after notice, I was told I 
had 10 days. For $500+ that he got anyway, Mr. Jensen expended a great amount of 
time and effort. This same judge conditionally vacated a default judgment of more than 
$30,000. far past 90 days old for Mr. Jensen and the same client. If Mr. Jensen is a 
religious man, the Golden Rule must not be a part of his ethic. 
Mr. Jensen cleverly used his client's bankruptcy in the spring of 2002, (See R. 
506-509 for discussion of automatic stay and R. 527 for Judge Pappas' order) causing 
complications in this case and bearing on the "mini-litigation" mentioned at p.34, "BofA". 
Not reflected in Mr. Jensen's billing affidavits are numerous stunts the trial court has 
had to endure, such as a hastily prepared defective Order in Supplemental Proceedings 
that caused a bench warrant to be issued against me. It had to be quashed. 
Judge Dever has endeavored to follow the remand instructions of this Court. His 
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"Judgment and Order", especially at p.3 (R. 843) shows that he made a detailed review 
of the billing and compared it "to the work product supplied to the Court". He did not say 
that his findings were exhaustive. His decision is subject to these rulings: 
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be 
overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988) and 
"the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to accept such self-interested testimony whole cloth and 
make such an award; and in the absence of patent error or clear abuse of discretion, this court will not 
disturb his findings or judgment." (footnote omitted), Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2d 520, 524 
(Utah 1978) 
Conclusion 
This Court is in the very unenviable position of finding clear, reversible error in a 
great cloud of confusion. Mr. Jensen mostly has difficulty with the trial court's discretion. 
The cases cited and experience show what Mr. Jensen observes, (p.47 "Brief of 
Appellants") "As it is now, fees can be from 10% to 100% of the amount requested ...." 
His own statement shows the this trial court's findings are not excessive. Many of Mr. 
Jensen's clients do find his rates and methods excessive; I stopped counting at 7 the 
number of clients he has sued for debt collection. It seems wise to have the trial courts 
evaluate attornev efficiency and discouraae oredatorv behaviour. 
I wonder if there is some overarching principle, some principle of restraint, some 
point of looking at the forest and not the trees that the courts abide by. Mr. Jensen's 
dispute with the courts, not me, has turned this purely self-interested pursuit of attorney 
fees from a "satellite litigation" to a solar system litigation. 
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Appelfees pray for an affirmation of the trial court's decision and whatever other relief 
this Court deems equitable. 
DATED December 28,2005 
Steven C. Blevins Debra Kay Blevins 
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